Using the coefficients estimated in our cost model we deconstruct real cost changes per student between 1987 and 2008 and between 2008 and 2010 into Baumol and Bowen effects. We find for every $1 in Baumol effects there are over $2 in Bowen effects. Tight revenue since 2008 reversed the previous decline in productivity and accelerated the trend in economizing on the use of tenure-track faculty. This behavior under loose and tight revenue constraints is consistent with Bowen's Rule. The model suggests the optimal staffing ratio is over two tenure-track faculty members per full-time administrator, while the current average ratio is two full-time administrators for one faculty member.
Introduction
Over the past three decades, increasing college costs 1 , declining undergraduate value added 2 , and ballooning student loans 3 became important public policy issues and these concerns are made more acute by declining household income, federal/state deficits, looming entitlement deficits, and seriously underfunded public pension obligations. Controlling college cost is now a priority, lest college costs further reduce economic mobility. "Baumol's Cost Disease 4 " and "Bowen's Rule 5 " are the most prominent higher education cost theories 6 . Baumol's cost disease argues costs rise due to external macroeconomic forces, while Bowen's rule claims cost increases are due to decisions taken inside higher education.
Baumol's cost disease is the disproportionate tendency of costs to rise in labor-intensive service industries. Increasing productivity in the macro-economy causes a general increase in real wages and those wages draw productive workers from service industries forcing them to raise wages even though productivity has not increased. The combination of fixed productivity and higher wages must lead to higher cost. Higher education insiders frequently argue government mandates and the Baumol effect are the source of higher education's chronic cost problem (Baumol and Batey-Blackman, 1995) .
1 See Martin (2011) or Massy (2003) , among others.
2 See Bok (2005) , Hersch and Merrow (2005) or Arum and Roksa (2011) .
3 See FRBNY (2012) and Parsons and Hennessey (2012) . 4 See Baumol and Bowen, W G, (1966) . 5 See Bowen, H R, (1980) . 6 In addition to Baumol and Bowen's theories there are two other cost drivers, government mandates and bundling services not previously associated with higher education. Government mandates are an external source of cost increases and bundling is an internal source of cost increases.
In the next section we review the traditional estimation of education cost functions and argue cost models without controls for staffing patterns suffer from omitted variable problems; that is, Bowen's rule suggests staffing patterns should be included in higher education cost equations. The data are reviewed in the third section and the governance hypothesis is explained in the fourth section. The governance hypothesis argues that shared governance lowers higher education costs, while the withering away of shared governance increases cost 8 . A total cost model is presented and estimated in section five and six, where the significance of staffing patterns is demonstrated, the governance hypothesis is tested, and other results are reported 9 . In section seven, we deconstruct the actual changes in cost per student from 1987 to 2008 and from 2008 to 2010. We find that Bowen effects under both loose and tight revenue constraints are larger than Baumol effects and that for every $1 in increased cost due to Baumol effects there are between $2 and $3 in Bowen effects. Post 2008, the model suggests universities shifted from selective cost saving to across the board cost saving and intensified their traditional cost saving.
Estimating Higher Education Cost Functions.
Traditionally higher education cost studies assume either costs are minimized (Cohn, et al., 1989 ) (Cohn, et al., 2004 ) (Johnes, et al., 2008) (Johnes, et al., 2009 ) or costs are not minimized (Newhouse, 1970 ) (James, 1978) (Brinkman, 1989 (Brinkman, , 1990 ) (Clotfelter, et al., 1991) (Ehrenberg, 2000) . If costs are in 8 See Ginsberg (2011) . 9 In an earlier version of this paper we estimated reduced form equations for academic cost and overhead costs and for total cost. We added another year of observations (2010) and the revenue variables to the sample for this version. We find the critical results with respect to the governance hypothesis and Baumol/Bowen effects are the same as those reported in the earlier version: adding more data and more control variables did not change the results. In the interest of space we do not report the results from the academic and overhead reduced form models in this new version of the paper. These results are available on request. fact minimized, the duality conditions allow one to uncover properties of the production function from the estimated parameters and the only data required are cost, output, and input prices (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995, 139-143) . Staffing patterns would not be needed.
In "for profit" industries, cost minimization is a reasonable assumption, since cost minimization is a necessary condition for profit maximization. In a non-profit environment, however, it does not necessarily follow that costs are minimized.
Bowen's rule is based on break-even budgeting, complex experience goods, shared governance, and unresolved agency problems (Martin, 2011) . The break-even revenue constraint leads to competition among agents for a fixed quantity of funds during each budget cycle. If agents collude to maximize rents and then distribute those rents there would be little conceptual difference between profit maximization and rent maximization, costs would be minimized, and the duality conditions would hold 10 . This is not what happens, however; rent seeking behavior in higher education leads agents to take rents in the form of higher expenditures within the areas they control. Therefore, rents are mixed with legitimate expenditures and this makes economic costs indistinguishable from rents 11 .
When rents are taken as expenditures, the cost allocation depends on the relative number and importance of the agents in the organization. Costs cannot be unpacked unless one examines staffing patterns. Hence, an empirical cost function that contains only output and input prices has omitted variable problems. Specifically, the cost model should control for staffing patterns across different constituencies in the institution. Alternatively, if higher education costs are minimized, the cost function should be independent of staffing patterns. As we find, the staffing variables are individually and collectively significant in the estimated cost function.
Data
The data are drawn from the National Center for Education Statistics' IPEDS website, it covers 137
Carnegie 12 I and II public research universities, for the academic years 1987, 1989, 1991, 1999, 2005, 2008, and 2010 . There are 982 usable observations in the estimating sample 13 . Our objective is to explain variations in costs between public research universities and across the time period studied; in general, these costs will be driven by decisions taken by each institution regarding academic and overhead staffing patterns, salaries paid, the nature of the undergraduate/graduate programs offered, and the size and composition of the institution's enrollment. Costs are also thought to be influenced by locations, both urban/rural and regional, Carnegie classification, and the emphasis placed on different types of graduate programs.
The variables. The cost 14 variables are real total cost per student (tc), real academic cost per student (ac) and real overhead cost per student (oh). Academic costs 15 include instruction, research, and 12 Carnegie I is classified as "very high research activity" and Carnegie II is "high research activity." There are 146 institutions in this classification. However, usable information was available for only 137 institutions. 13 There are two data samples in this study. The first is the estimating sample which contains 137 institutions and 981 usable observations for the period studied. This sample is used in the estimation of the cost equations. The second sample is the cost analysis sample which contains 133 institutions and 812 usable observations. The cost analysis sample is smaller than the estimating sample because the partial differential method for deconstructing the cost changes requires that for each 1987 observation there must be a matching 2008 observation and a matching 2010 observation. Only 133 institutions provided usable data in all years.
14 Between 1987 and 2010 these institutions adopted significant accounting changes. These changes make it difficult to get consistent time series data on cost. The most consistent total cost series are "total current funds expenditures and transfers total" for 1987 and "total operating expenses -Current year total" for 2010. Using "total educational and general expenditures and transfers total" for 1987 tends to significantly understate the overhead cost in 1987, leading to an overstatement of the total change in overhead spending from 1987 to 2010. public service; while overhead costs include all costs from academic support, student services, institutional support, plant operation/maintenance, auxiliary activities, hospitals, and independent operations. Enrollment is measured by FTE students (ftestu), the number of full-time undergraduate students (ftug), the number of full-time graduate 16 students (ftgrad), and the number of part-time students (ptstu).
Faculty staffing is measured by the number of tenure-track faculty per 100 students (tt), the number of contract faculty per 100 students (cf), the number of part-time faculty per 100 students (ptf), the number of FTE faculty per 100 students (ftef), the number of teaching assistants per 100 students (ta), and the ratio of tenure-track faculty to full-time non-academic professional employees (ttad). Fulltime non-academic professional employees include executives, managers, and other professional staff.
FTE staff salaries are the total salaries and wages paid divided by the number of FTE staff employed (staffsal). Full-time employee benefits are measured by total benefits paid divided by full-time staff members (benstaff).
Non-instructional staffing is measured by the number of FTE executive/managerial employees per 100 students (fteex), the number of other FTE professional employees per 100 students (ftepro), and the number of FTE non-professional employees per 100 students (ftenpro). The composite variable, fteadmin, is the number of FTE executive and professional employees per 100 students. The average number of "reports" per executive is measured by the sum of all FTE professional administrators and all FTE nonprofessional staff divided by the number of FTE executives/managers (staffsize). Part-time 15 Some researchers claim student service cost should be included in academic costs. Student service staffing expanded rapidly from 1987 to 2010 and student service professionals claim it is their responsibility to take over "instruction outside the classroom." The nature of these activities and the academic qualifications of student service personnel make this notion arguable at least. What is clear is that the inclusion of student service in academic cost will significantly understate the growth in overhead if it is included in academic cost. 16 The number of graduate students includes graduate and professional students as well. staff employment is measured by the number of part-time administrators per 100 students (ptadmin), and the number of part-time non-professional staff per 100 students (ptnpro). The asymmetric treatment of faculty versus administrator counts and salary data has persisted for over three decades. Among charitable organizations, efficiency is measured by the "activity ratio;" for higher education the activity ratio is the academic share of total cost. The absence of accurate administrator numbers and salary data makes it impossible to calculate an accurate activity ratio for higher education; at the very least, this is a major regulatory oversight by the Department of Education.
In any event, these are the inherent limitations in the IPEDS data set. With respect to all the foregoing staffing ratios, it is important to remember they are defined as the number of staff members per 100 FTE students; hence, the number of staff members has to grow faster than the number of students in order for those ratios to rise. This means the actual number of staff members is growing faster than the number of students when the ratio rises. The staff changes after 2008 are cost cutting efforts for all types of staffing; this is consistent with Bowen's description of university behavior under tight revenue constraints and loose revenue constraints. "Within wide limits, institutions can adjust to whatever amount of money they are able to raise. When resources are increased, they find uses for the new funds, and unit costs go up. When resources are decreased, they express keen regret and they protest, but in the end they accept the inevitable, and costs go down. This set of generalizations might be called the revenue theory of cost" (Bowen, 1980, 15) .

The Governance Hypothesis
Since agency problems always result in costs higher than necessary, higher education's cost history from 1987 to 2008 is an agency problem's latent print. Therefore, an important empirical task is to identify the core agency problem: is it pampered tenure-track faculty, empire building administrators, or both agent groups? The natural constraints on agency abuse in corporations and in politics are the market for corporate control and elections; the shared part of shared governance is the only natural constraint on agency abuse in higher education.
The forgoing suggests three competing governance hypotheses: The tenured faculty, the spendthrift administrator, or the shared governance hypotheses. The tenured faculty hypothesis holds that powerful tenure-track faculties prevent cost conscious administrators from controlling cost. An equally viable hypothesis is the cost problem originates with spendthrift administrators, since they have de facto control over spending. If either the tenured faculty or spendthrift administrator hypotheses are true, the solution is to adopt incentive compatible contracts or constraints on adverse agency behavior for the offending agent group. The shared governance hypothesis 21 holds that both agent groups are the problem and a partial solution is to balance their respective pursuit of self-interest through a stronger shared governance contract between faculty, administrators, and governing boards. Benjamin If the cost problem is primarily due to the tenured faculty hypothesis, then the marginal effect of ttad should be positive; costs should rise as ttad increases. If the cost problem is primarily due to spendthrift administrators, then the marginal effect of ttad should be negative. Finally, if shared governance is an effective constraint on agency abuse from all parties, cost should be a convex function of ttad; an optimal ratio should exist and an imbalance either way should lead to higher costs.
Model Specification
For Total Cost (tc) we specify the log-linear regression . The least squares, random effects and fixed effects parameter estimates are reported in Table 2 . The OLS estimates are reported in the first column, random effects estimates 22 in the second column, random effects estimates with robust cluster standard errors in the third column, fixed effects estimates in the fourth column and fixed effects estimates with robust cluster standard errors in the fifth column. For the purpose of "deconstructing costs," and the results in Table 3 of the paper, the parameters  are estimated using fixed effects since the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the regressors and random effects are uncorrelated in each equation. 23 The parameter estimates are denoted  . We employ robust cluster-corrected covariance 22 All model estimations are carried out in Stata 12.1 23 This conclusion was drawn on the basis of the usual contrast tests under the assumption of homoscedasticity (no clustering), and also the regression based Hausman test describe in Wooldridge (2010, 332) . In this test the averages of the matrix estimates V , because some residual correlation across time remains even after including year dummies. 24 We then employ the partial differential approach to quantify the Baumol and Bowen effects in the next section.
The omitted faculty staffing ratio is the tenure-track/student ratio; hence, the interpretation is,
holding ftef constant an increase in cf or ptf represents a substitution for tenure-track faculty. The expectation is the signs of cf and ptf should be negative, since they are a lower cost alternative to tenuretrack faculty. Similarly, holding cf and ptf constant an increase in ftef represents an increase in tenuretrack faculty. Therefore, the sign of ftef should be positive.
The omitted administrator staffing ratio is the full-time administrator/student ratio. Hence, holding fteadmin constant, an increase in ptadmin represents a substitution of part-time employees for full-time employees, suggesting the coefficient should be negative since part-time employees do not receive benefits. The same interpretation applies to the inclusion of ftenpro and ptnpro. The coefficient for ftenpro should be positive and ptnpro should be negative. The variable staffsize is a metric for overhead staff sizes, suggesting its coefficient should be positive, since staffsize equals the sum of ftepro plus ftenpro divided by fteex.
Scale effects are measured by ftestu. The mix between undergraduate and graduate programs is controlled for by ftgrad, ftestu, and ptstu; holding ftestu and ptstu constant an increase in ftgrad time varying variables are added as regressors in a random effects estimation and their significance jointly tested based on a cluster corrected covariance matrix. Using not only the complete set of time varying variables, but also various subsets of those variables, we reject the null hypothesis that the heterogeneity is not correlated with the time averages. Augmenting the regression with the time averages of regressors, Mundlak's (1978) approach, and applying random effects [Greene, 2012, 381; Wooldridge, 2010, 332] offers no meaningful gain in efficiency. The standard form of the more general correlated random effects model of Chamberlain (1982) [Greene, 2012, 383; Wooldridge, 2010, 347-349] does not apply since our panel is unbalanced.
represents a substitution of one full-time graduate student for one full-time undergraduate student.
Other things equal, an increase in ftgrad represents an increase in graduate intensity and it should increase costs. Holding ftgrad and ptstu constant, an increase in ftestu should reduce costs due to both scale effects and program mix effects. The variable ta is the number of teaching/research assistants per 100 students; hence, it is a control for the intensity of PhD programs on campus. On the other hand, if teaching assistants replace contract faculty or part-time faculty, costs may decline as ta increases.
Therefore, the expected sign of ta is ambiguous.
Bowen's revenue theory of cost suggests the signs of operating revenue and investment income should be positive. We include rev, donor, hosp, and other in the equation excluding core revenues; therefore, holding rev constant the interpretation is an increase in donor, hosp, or other represents a replacement of $1 in core revenue with $1 from one of those sources. If $1 of increased revenue from any of these sources has the same Bowen effect on cost, the coefficients should be insignificant.
Estimation Results.
Results using fixed effects estimation are contained in column (5) of Table 2 25 . The coefficients for cf, ftef, ptstu, ttad, ttad2, fteadmin, fteadmin2, ftenpro, staffsal, staffsize, d1999, d1991, d2005, d2008 , and d2010 are statistically significant using a two-tail test at the 0.01 or better level and have the anticipated signs. The coefficients for ptf, ftgrad, rev, and d1989 are statistically significant using a two-tail test at the 0.05 or better level.
The signs for ttad and ttad2 suggest total cost is convex in ttad with an estimated turning point at 3.1 with 95% interval estimate [2.49, 3.66] . The elasticities of total cost at the quartiles of ttad are 25 Fixed effects estimates obtained using XTREG, FE in Stata 12.1. Standard errors are based on a cluster corrected covariance matrix, which is used because some significant serial correlation remains even with year dummies. −0.072, −0.092 and −0.112, respectively. 26 The tenure-track faculty hypothesis is rejected, while the spendthrift administrator and shared governance hypotheses are consistent with the data. These results are robust to the estimation method used, the addition of new data, change in specification, and Carnegie classification.
The signs for fteadmin and fteadmin2 suggest total cost is concave in fteadmin; total cost per student increases at a decreasing rate as the professional administrator per 100 student ratio increases.
The implied peak value is 16 professional administrators per 100 27 ; that value is well within the data experience, as the maximum value is 38 per 100. This result is also robust to specification and additional data. The elasticities of total cost at the quartiles of fteadmin are 0.097, 0.117, and 0.125, respectively.
28
As anticipated by Bowen's revenue theory of cost, total cost is an increasing function of total operating revenue from the previous year. The coefficient for investment income is positive and significant at the 10% level. Since institutions use weighted average payout ratios from endowments, this result is not surprising.
Cost Analysis
Our primary objective is to deconstruct changes in total cost per student into effects are "forecasts" within each sample experience, since all changes in the independent variables are known and drawn from the sample. The results for the "loose" constraint and "tight" periods are contained in tables 3A and 3B, respectively.
The Partial Differentials: Econometric Methods
The log-linear specification implies the expectation
The predicted value should incorporate an estimate of   
29 Cameron and Trivedi (2010, 108 
Deconstructions: Econometric Methods
Rather than the total differential we consider partial differentials using subsets of the regressor differential i dx by setting some of its elements to zero. Specifically, the partial differential for the following incremental effects would involve subsets of the independent variables as follows: 
We would like to test the null and alternative hypotheses 33 For the tight revenue period from 2008 to 2010, the institutions shifted from selective cost cutting to across the board cost cutting, they were no longer lowering administrative productivity as they did from 1987 to 2008. Bowen says rents are taken as lower productivity under loose revenue constraints and reversed during tight revenue constraints. What was Bowen lost "productivity" becomes improved productivity after 2008. Hence, the absolute value of the "productivity" effect is still a Bowen effect after 2008. This is accomplished by changing the sign of the Bowen productivity term in (13) 
H d tc h d tc h H d tc h d tc h
The test statistic is
The numerator is 
The denominator of the t-statistic uses a variance calculation based on the delta method. Note that the form of the differential in (8) and (16) is the same, and thus the Jacobian matrix (10) is of the same form in both cases.
Discussion of Deconstructions
Salaries and Benefits. If staffing patterns do not change, one can interpret staffsal and benstaff as the average wage and benefit paid; but this is not the case, we know staffing patterns changed significantly. Therefore, we separate the changes in staffsal and benstaff due to staffing patterns from the total change in the two variables and assign the changes driven by staffing patterns to Bowen effects and the residual to Baumol effects. The cost disease holds that productivity is constant and that salaries are driven by external labor market conditions. Alternatively, declines in staff productivity are consistent with agency problems and Bowen's rule.
We measure the impact of changing staffing patterns on both staffsal and benstaff through correlation analyses between staffsal/benstaff and all of the staffing variables. The correlation analyses reveal that 48 percent of the variation in staffsal is accounted for by variation in the staffing variables and 49 percent of the variation in benstaff is accounted for by variation in the staffing variables. Hence, we assume the change in Baumol salaries equals 52 percent of the observed change in salaries and 51 percent of the observed change in benstaff. on average total cost. Similarly, the positive and significant effect of part-time students on cost would also tend to lower cost as part-time enrollment declined throughout the period. The coefficients for ftgrad and ta are positive, suggesting the higher costs associated with growing graduate programs were offset by part-time student and scale effects from undergraduate enrollment.
Cost Saving. The public research universities reduced costs by reducing the non-professional staff/student ratio and using contract and part-time faculty more intensively. The partial differential estimates using ftenpro, ptnpro, cf, and ptf, suggest total cost declined by $4,080 per student. Had these cost savings been passed on to students and taxpayers, total cost per student would be lower by that amount during the loose constraint period. During the tight constraint period, the forgoing measures reduced cost by $757 per student. More significantly, the cost saving achieved by reversing reductions in productivity (lowering ftef, fteadmin, ptadmin, ptnpro, and staffsize) was $1,094 per student from 2008 to 2010.
During the loose constraint period, universities adopted selective productivity programs that excluded administrators and during the tight constraint period, universities adopted across the board productivity programs; this is the most dramatic change in behavior between the loose and tight regimes.
Hence, universities can improve staff productivity.
Since total cost increased, it is clear the cost savings were spent on other activities. Therefore, the expected change in cost is equal to the actual change plus the cost that was saved. This is the amount that must be accounted for by Baumol 
Baumol Effects.
The classic Baumol effect is higher real wages and benefits with constant productivity. Implicit in this argument is that real wages and benefits are market driven and have no administrative content (no agency effects); further, the pure Baumol effect argues rising service costs are imposed on the service industries by general market effects that are external to the service industries per se.
As discussed above, Baumol salaries are 52 percent of the total change in staffsal and 51 percent of the total change in benstaff. During the loose constraint period, the partial differential Baumol salary estimate is $2,720. This represents 16 percent of the change in total cost per student. The Baumol benefits estimate is $59. The Baumol salary and benefits estimates for the tight revenue constraint period from 2008 to 2010 are $607 and $17, respectively.
Bowen Effects.
In the presence of unresolved agency problems, one cannot assume that productivity will be maintained and that salaries will not have an administrative component. Contrary to
Baumol's cost disease, the data reveal that faculty and staff productivity did not remain constant from 1987 to 2008, or from 2008 to 2010; nor did administrative staff productivity improve as we would expect from what was happening in the rest of the economy during that period (Jorgenson, et. al, 2008 ) (Gera and Gu, 2004) . On the other hand, these staff changes are consistent with Bowen's rule.
The partial differential estimates for the Bowen adverse productivity effect are measured by changes in ftef, fteadmin, ptadmin, and staffsize. The estimate for total cost during the loose revenue constraint period is $3,593. This represents 21 percent of the increase in total cost for that period. The shift to improving productivity during the tight constraint period was discussed in the cost saving section. The partial differential estimate for Bowen salary effects is $2,510. This is 15 percent of the total for the loose revenue constraint period. The adverse effect of changes in faculty governance is measured by ttad and the partial differential estimate for total cost is $955. This is 6 percent of the total increase in cost during the loose revenue constraint period.
The combined effect of the revenue variables during the loose revenue constraint is $2,355 per student, which is 14 percent of the total change. During the tight revenue constraint, the revenue effect is $717, which is 29 percent of the change in cost per student.
In Table 1 , the academic share of total cost increased from 48 percent in 2008 to 55 percent in 2010, a substantial increase for a two year period. This shift in the share suggests $2,744 per student was moved out of administrative costs and into academic costs. Since academic staffing reductions decreased cost by $808 per student, the total swing in academic cost per student was $3,552. If we assume all the cost reductions associated with fteadmin, ftenpro, ptadmin, ptnpro, and staffsize are part of the shift from administrative costs to academic costs, we account for $1,042 of the $3,552 shift; the rest remains unexplained. Another unfavorable case for the significance of Bowen effects is contained in Table 3A and Table 3B; we assume all Baumol effects are at the upper bound, while all Bowen effects are at the lower bound for their respective 95 percent confidence intervals. Under this assumption, the estimate is $2.2 to $1. A realistic allocation of salaries and benefits suggests Bowen effects exceed Baumol effects by at least 2 to 1.
The deconstruction of cost changes during two years of tight revenue 2008 to 2010 reveals that the Bowen/Baumol ratio is about $3.8 to $1. The most significant changes between loose constraints to tight constraints are the productivity effect shifts from reductions in productivity to increases in productivity and to a dramatic increase in the academic share of total cost. The data also reveal the institutions intensified their traditional cost saving behavior after 2008. From this information and the historical record for decreases in cost during the Great Depression and during the 1970's it appears tight revenue lowers agency effects, while loose revenue tends to induce agency effects. This is very intuitive.
Conclusions
We estimate a total cost function for public research universities. Some higher education cost studies assume costs are minimized. These studies are consistent with the argument that higher costs are imposed on colleges and universities by the macro-economy (since they are minimizing cost) and not due to internal decisions taken by these universities. If costs are minimized, duality insures that cost functions can be estimated with input prices and output. Bowen's rule implies costs are not minimized due to unresolved agency problems and the peculiarities of experience goods. Therefore, staff/student ratios are essential control variables for unraveling changes in costs due to decisions taken inside higher education. Our results demonstrate that staff/student ratios are collectively and individually significant;
Bowen's rule has a significant impact on cost.
There are three shared governance hypotheses unique to higher education. A popular hypothesis is intransigent tenure-track faculty prevent costs from being minimized by cost conscious administrators.
If this is the case, the shared governance metric (the ratio of tenure-track faculty to full-time professional administrators) should be positively correlated with cost. However, the ratio is significant and negatively correlated, which suggests the cost problem is primarily due to overspending by administrators. The data further suggests cost is convex in the tenure-track/administrator ratio.
Convexity of cost is consistent with the hypothesis that shared governance is a constraint on agency abuse by any agent group in higher education. The pattern of these results mean the higher education cost problem will be made worse if tenure-track faculty lose all influence on resource allocation.
We believe the current optimal staffing ratio is a product of existing governance contracts and we believe those contracts are weak as it relates to the faculty's role in resource allocation decisions. If the faculty's role in resource decisions was codified in campus governance (the role is strengthened by contract), stronger agency constraints would lead to lower cost and a lower optimal tenure-track to administrator ratio. 
